By Mel Gurtov
Promises, Promises
The much-awaited meeting in Korea between Pres. Trump and Pres. Xi Jinping promised—according to Trump—a major trade deal. The Chinese seemed prepared to offer much less.
In remarks to Trump, Xi repeated Chinese refrains about the need for cooperation, stressed that the business relationship is the “anchor and driving force” in China-US relations, and expressed confidence that inevitable frictions could be overcome. Xi also made clear that China’s economy is strong: “We have the confidence and capability to navigate all kinds of risks and challenges,” Xi said.
In other words, China is not in any kind of economic trouble that might make it susceptible to outside pressure. A “cycle of mutual retaliation” is unacceptable, he said.
Mutual retaliation was avoided this time, but the accomplishments at the Xi-Trump meeting were modest. According to China’s summary, Xi promised to resume purchases of US soybeans for three years; place more Chinese controls on fentanyl (in return for a lowering of the US tariff related to fentanyl); and suspend China’s regulations on rare earth exports for one year in exchange for US suspension of restrictions on advanced technology exports to China. As always in these exchanges, the devil is in the details, and the details in the US “fact sheet” on the meeting diverge considerably from China’s.
Loopholes and Ambiguities
First, on Chinese soybean purchases, whereas the US specifies the quantity of soybeans China has committed to buy from now through 2028, China’s reporting has no figures and could be far less than Trump is trumpeting. The US fact sheet also notes China’s promise to purchase or end tariffs on numerous US products, from dairy to fruits and cotton. China’s readout doesn’t mention any of them. (By the way, American farmers’ common reaction to the deal, according to press reports, is that “it doesn’t solve anything,” since the promised purchases are no greater than before and farmers also face, because of Trump’s tariffs, higher costs for machinery, fertilizer, and seeds.)
Second, the crucial issue of China’s rare earth minerals exports has by no means been resolved with the Trump-Xi meeting. According to the US fact sheet, China will eliminate all the regulations on those minerals that were enacted starting in 2022 and not just controls imposed this year. Such a comprehensive removal may not be what Xi promised or intended, especially since those minerals are a major source of Chinese leverage on Trump’s tariff policy.
Third, the agreement leaves unclear what technology exports to China will actually be allowed—most importantly whether the latest Nvidia chips, which experts believe would be a strategic mistake to sell to China, will be available. (The House Select Committee on China warned on social media that selling AI chips to China “would be akin to giving Iran weapons grade uranium.”)
Fourth, on fentanyl, the US says, “China will stop the shipment of certain designated chemicals to North America and strictly control exports of certain other chemicals to all destinations in the world.” That is quite a promise, and if China actually made it, it is hard to see how the promise can be fulfilled.
Fifth, questions remain about what the US and Chinese average tariff rates will be as a result of the Trump-Xi meeting. The US seems to expect that China’s tariffs on many US imports will be removed or suspended. Various reports indicate that US tariffs on Chinese goods will still be very high: 47%. The lack of clarity on this issue may affect how much rare earth minerals the Chinese sell to the US, or how much US agricultural products they actually buy.
Sixth, the US fact sheet mentions China’s agreement to “terminate its various investigations targeting U.S. companies in the semiconductor supply chain, including its antitrust, anti-monopoly, and anti-dumping investigations.” China’s readout does not mention such an agreement.
Two other kinds of issues important to US-China relations were apparently not addressed. One is future areas of cooperation. Xi offered a modest menu of joint projects for future dialogue: “combating illegal immigration and telecom fraud, anti-money laundering, artificial intelligence, and responding to infectious diseases.” Trump’s response, if any, was not reported.
Then there are key policy differences that apparently were not brought up at the meeting: China’s support of Russia in the Ukraine war and the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Taiwan’s leadership has to be relieved, since some observers were saying that Trump might sacrifice support of Taiwan to gain a comprehensive trade agreement. (In a “60 Minutes” interview Sunday night, Trump said there was no need to bring up Taiwan with Xi since Xi knows what would happen if he decided to invade Taiwan. I guess we can say that Trump endorses the longstanding US policy on Taiwan of “strategic ambiguity.”)
In sum, we can credit the meeting with having eased US-China trade tensions by focusing on the key areas of disagreement and putting off a trade war that would benefit no one. On the other hand, the meeting kicked the can down the road. Promises made and not kept will revive tensions before too long, just as they did in Trump’s first term and in Joe Biden’s term. The bottom line is that the basis for mutual mistrust has not been addressed and is highly unlikely to be addressed until a new set of leaders emerges in both countries.
Nuclear Curveball
Trump threw a curveball into the meeting with an announcement, just minutes before he landed, that the United States would immediately restart nuclear weapons testing after a lull of 33 years. The announcement came after Russia announced that it had also conducted tests of a nuclear-capable cruise missile and sea drone this week.
This is the kind of unpredictable, and unwelcome, diplomacy typical of Trump. In practice, it probably won’t mean US detonation of a nuclear bomb, which would be contrary to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Weapon Test Ban agreement that the US signed but has never ratified. Most likely, Trump wants renewed testing of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Asked whether he believed his directive would create a riskier nuclear environment, Trump offered his usual exaggerated confidence: “I think we have it pretty well locked up.”
Trump added that the United States was already in talks with Russia about “denuclearization” and that “China would be added to that.” I’ll bet that’s news to both Moscow and Beijing.
Besides their display of new nuclear weapons, the Russians have indicated they will pull out of the treaty on plutonium production, hardly an indicator of denuclearization. China has consistently refused to join US-Russia nuclear weapon talks because it is engaged in a nuclear weapon expansion program as it seeks to narrow the gap with the US and Russia.
If anything, Trump’s sudden announcement will spur China’s expanding nuclear program, especially since Trump has also agreed to provide fuel for a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine and—under Biden but with Trump’s endorsement—to providing Australia with a nuclear sub under the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-US) agreement.
Trump Leaves, Xi Stays
After meeting with Xi, Trump returned to Washington in time for a Halloween party. Xi stayed in Korea for a meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum. He used the occasion of Trump’s absence to reinforce China’s message of economic cooperation to ease supply chains, keep tariffs low, and promote adherence to global trade rules—in short, work with China’s rather than the US’s leadership, which he accused (without naming it) of a “return of hegemonism and the law of the jungle.”
“The rougher the seas, the more we must pull together,” said Xi. He held separate meetings with the leaders of Japan, Canada, and Thailand—the one with Mark Carney notable for Canada’s decision to expand trade with China now that Trump is refusing to negotiate.
Trump brought home trade agreements with South Korea and Japan, but Xi has established China as Asia Pacific’s trade leader. Not that countries in the region all welcome that development, since China exercises its own brand of trade pressure. But faced with high US tariffs and constant uncertainty about US policy, most Asia Pacific countries will count increasingly on China’s trade, investments, and loans.
Mel Gurtov, syndicated by PeaceVoice, is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University.
